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Loss of a Chance as a Cause of Action
in Medical Malpractice Cases
Wollen v. DePaulHealth Center
I. INTRODUCTION
Regarding the subject of causation in torts, Prosser and Keeton write,
"There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth
more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of
confusion."2 Judicial treatment of the relationship between causation and the
relatively new theory of loss of a chance in medical malpractice cases
demonstrates this welter of confusion. In 1992, the Supreme Court of
Missouri addressed whether loss of chance can constitute a cause of action
under Missouri law. This Note will examine the Wollen decision as well as
the myriad of cases addressing loss of chance.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Linda F. Wollen filed a wrongful death action against Dr. Richard F.
Jotte, Sr., DePaul Health Center, Ernst Radiology Clinic, Inc., and Dr. Edwin

Ernst, III, for damages arising from the death of her husband, David L.
Wollen Ms. Wollen alleged the defendants failed to perform appropriate
tests on her husband and incorrectly interpreted the tests conducted.4
Furthermore, proper procedures would have indicated that Mr. Wollen was
suffered from gastric cancer.5 Had Mr. Wollen been accurately diagnosed

1. 828 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1992).
2. W. PAGE

KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 41,

at 263 (5th ed. 1984).
3. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 681. Missouri's wrongful death statute, Mo. REV.

STAT. § 537.080 (1986), reads as follows:
Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct,
occurrence, transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued,
would have entitled such person to recover damages in respect thereof, the

person or party who, or the corporation which, would have been liable if
death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured ....

4. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 681-82.
5. Id. at 682.
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and given treatment, his chance of surviving the disease would have been
approximately thirty percent.6
The Circuit Court of St. Louis County dismissed Ms. Wollen's complaint
because she failed to plead a causal connection between the defendants'
negligence and the death of her husband.7 Although the trial court granted
Ms. Wollen leave to amend her petition, she refused and appealed to the
Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals.'
In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.' The court held Ms. Wollen did not properly plead that the
defendants' negligence was a legal cause of her husband's death.1" In order
to make a submissible case, the court noted, Ms. Wollen should have proven
it was "more probable than not" that the defendants' failure to diagnose the
cancer caused her husband's injury." Because Mr. Wollen would have had
only a thirty percent chance of survival if the cancer was diagnosed, his12death,
more probably than not, would have happened because of his cancer.
Ms. Wollen argued she was not required to prove the defendants' conduct
was, more probably than not, the cause of her husband's death; but rather, that
the defendants' conduct was, more probably than not, merely a substantial
factor in causing her husband's death." The court rejected this argument.' 4
Ms. Wollen appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court. The court ordered
the case transferred; vacated the decision of the court of appeals; and
remanded the case for trial."5 The court held Ms. Wollen alleged facts
supporting an action for lost chance of recovery under Missouri's survivorship

statute, which applies when the underlying injury did not cause death.16
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., No. 58420, 1991 WL 114001 (Mo. Ct. App.
June 28, 1991).
10. Id. at *1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *11.
15. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 686.
16. Id. at 685. Missouri's survivorship statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.020
(1986), reads as follows:

Causes of action for personal injuries, other than those resulting in
death, whether such injuries be to the health or to the person of the injured
party, shall not abate by reason of his death, nor by reason of the death of
the person against whom such cause of action shall have accrued; but in

case of the death of either or both such parties, such cause of action shall
survive to the personal representative or such injured party, and against the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/5
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

In order to clarify the relationship between causation and the theory of
lost chance of recovery, it is necessary to examine the basic rules underlying
causation in tort cases, including the rules for determining causation, proving
causation, and introducing evidence of causation.
The usual medical malpractice case is a tort action sounding in
negligence. Therefore, the plaintiff must prove the basic elements of
negligence: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. 7 To satisfy the
causation element the plaintiff must show both but-for causation and
proximate causation."8 Under the traditional rule for determining but-for
causation, the plaintiff must show that the injury would not have occurred
without the defendant's conduct.19 In the large majority of cases, this
traditional and simple rule will be sufficient to determine but-for causation.2"
The traditional rule cannot determine but-for causation, however, in cases
where two or more forces, each independently sufficient to produce an injury,
combine simultaneously to produce injury."
The .classic example
demonstrating the difficulty in applying the traditional rule for determining
but-for causation in these situations is the "twin fires" problem, where a
defendant negligently starts a fire which merges with another fire to destroy
the plaintiff's property.22 But for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's
injury would still have occurred.
In cases where two or more independently sufficient forces combine to
produce injury, courts have developed a different rule for determining but-for
causation.' To establish but-for causation in these cases, the plaintiff must
show the defendant's act or failure to act was a "substantial factor" in causing

person, receiver, or corporation liable for such injuries and his legal
representatives, and the liability and the measure of damages shall be the

same as if such death or deaths had not occurred.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 681.
18. For a dctailed discussionof but-for causation, also labelled cause-in-fact, see
Christopher M. Hohn, Note, Cause-In-Factin Missouri: A Return to Normalcy,
Callahanv. CardinalGlennon Hospital,59 Mo. L. REv. 947 (1994).
19. KEETON ET AL., supranote 2, at 266.

20. See Hohn, supra note 18, at 950.
21. KEETON ET AL., supranote 2, at 266.

22. See David A. Fischer, ProportionalLiability: StatisticalEvidence and the
ProbabilityParadox,46 VAND. L. REv. 1201, 1210 n.21 (1993); Hohn, supra,note
18, at 954.
23. Id.
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the plaintiff's harm.24 Even though the substantial factor test usually applies
to but-for causation, some courts will apply it to proximate causation.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving causation, regardless of whether
the court uses the traditional or substantial factor rule for determining but-for
causation.' The plaintiff must prove it was "more probable than not" that
the defendant's act, or failure to act, caused the plaintiff's injuries.26
Reduced to a mathematical concept, the plaintiff must prove a greater than
fifty percent chance that the defendant's act or failure to act caused the
injury

27

Because a medical malpractice case often involves matters outside a
jury's common knowledge, the plaintiff should introduce expert medical

24. Hamilv. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. 1978). See also RESTAnENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965): "The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of
harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm ...." Comment a, following § 431, defines substantial factor: "The word
'substantial' is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has "such an effect
in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that
word in the popular sense.. . ." KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 268; Hohn, supra
note 18, at 950.
25. KEETON ET AL., supranote 2, at 269.
26. See Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 681-82. This was the approach taken by the
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, in denying recovery for Ms. Wollen. See
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 269:
On the issue of the fact of causation, as on other issues essential to his
cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff, in general, has the burden of
proof. He must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the
conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant
was a substantial factor in bringing about the result. A mere possibility of
such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure
speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced,
it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. a (1965):
In civil cases, the plaintiff is required to produce evidence that the conduct
of the defendant has been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm he
has suffered, and to sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. This means that he must make it appear that it is more likely
than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm. A mere possibility of such causation is not
enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture,
or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the
court to direct a verdict for the defendant.
Cf 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 436 (1989).
27. Wollen, 1991 WL 114001 at *8.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/5
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testimony 28that establishes causation to a "reasonable degree of medical
certainty.
In some medical malpractice cases, primarily those involving a failure to
diagnose a preexisting condition, the plaintiff may not be able to prove
causation by a greater than fifty percent chance because the decedent, due to
a preexisting condition, had less than a fifty percent chance of living even if
properly diagnosed and treated. It is more probable than not that the
preexisting condition, rather than. the defendant's actions, caused the injury.
In these unique medical malpractice cases, however, some courts have
developed new rules to allow the cause of action to go forward, based on the
theory of lost chance of recovery.
A. JurisdictionsAllowing Recovery for Loss of a Chance
Many jurisdictions allowing recovery for loss of a chance29 cite obiter
dictum from Hicks v. United States" as the genesis for loss of chance as a
cause of action: "[w]hen a defendant's negligent action or inaction has
effectively terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the
defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that
he has, put beyond the possibility of realization."31 Aside from recognizing
this as a general statement underlying the principles of the law, courts differ
in their approach to loss of a chance. This section will discuss the various
legal standards, damage valuation methods, and policy considerations cited by
courts allowing recovery for loss of chance.32

28. Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1285.
29. In the following jurisdictions, courts allow recovery for loss of a chance in
medical malpractice cases: Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 605
(Ariz. 1984); Blackmon v. Langley, 737 S.W.2d 455 (Ark. 1987); Shively v. Klein,
551 A.2d 41 (Del. 1988); Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Dickerson, 356 S.E.2d 548
(Ga. 1987); Mayhue v. Sparkman, 627 N.E.2d 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Sanders v.
Ghrist, 421 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1988); Robersonv. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149 (Kan.

1984); Martin v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 582 So. 2d 1272 (La. 1991); Falconv.
Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990); Aasheimv. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824
(Mont. 1985); Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991); Scafidi v.
Seiler, 574 A.2d 398 (N.J. 1990); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., 741 P.2d 467
(Okla. 1987); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); Blondel v. Hays, 403
S.E.2d 340 (Va. 1991); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash.
1983); Thornton v. CAMC, Etc., 305 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1983); Ehlinger by Ehlinger
v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. 1990).
30. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966)
31. Id. at 632.
32. For a general discussionof loss of a chance, see JohnD. Hodson, Annotation,

MedicalMalpractice: "Loss ofa Chance"Causality,54 A.L.R. 4TH 10 (1987); Martin
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 5

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

1. Legal Standards
Jurisdictions allow recovery for loss of a chance based on one of two
fundamental approaches, depending on how the court view the underlying
injury. Under the first approach, courts adopt a "relaxed causation" standard

J. MoMahon, Annotation, MedicalMalpractice: Measure and Elements of Damages
in Actions Based on Loss of Chance, 81 A.L.R.4th 485 (1990). There is also a
considerable amount of commentary on loss of a chance. See Beth Clemens Boggs,
Lost Chance of SurvivalDoctrine: Should the CourtsEver Tinker With Chance?, 16
S. ILL. U. L.J. 421 (1992); William M. Bradt & John H. Guthmann, Recoveryfor the
Value of a Chance in MedicalNegligence Cases: Bringing Minnesota'sStandard of
CausationUp to Date, 12 WM. MITCHrLL L. REV. 459 (1986); Darrell L. Keith, Loss
of Chance: A Modem ProportionalApproach to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L.
REv. 759 (1992); Jim M. Perdue, Recoveryfor a Lost Chance of Survival: When the
DoctorGambles, Who Puts Up the Stakes?, 28 S. TEX. L.J. 37 (1987); Lisa Perrochet
et al., Lost Chance Recovery and the Folly of Expanding Medical Malpractice
Liability, 27 TORT AND INs. L.J. 615 (1992); Linda M. Roubik, Recovery for
'Loss-of-Chance'in a Wrongful DeathAction-Herskovitsv. Group Health, 59 WASH.
L. Rav. 981 (1984); Allen E. Shoenberger, MedicalMalpracticeInjury: Causation
and Valuation of the Loss of Chance to Survive, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 511985); Patricia
L. Andel, Comment, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Recoverfor the Loss of a
Chance of Survival, 12 PEPP. L. REv. 973 (1985); Stephen F. Brennwald, Comment,
ProvingCausationin "Loss of a Chance" Cases: A ProportionalApproach, 34 CATH.
U. L. REv. 747 (1985); Howard Ross Feldman, Comment, Chances as Protected
Interests: Recoveryfor the Loss of a Chance and IncreasedRisk, 17 U. BALT. L.
REv. 139 (1987); Shelley E. Smith, Comment, Lost Chance of Survival in Illinois:
The Needfor Guidancefrom the Illinois Supreme Court, 23 LoY. U. ClI. L.J. 155
(1991); Jonathan D. Wolf, Comment, Playing the Percentages: A Re-Examination of
Recovery for Loss of Chance, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 429 (1986); David W.
Counce, Note, Medical Malpractice: The Increased Risk Rule: Establishing
"Probable"CausationThroughMere Possibility, 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 257 (1985); Ellen
M. Foran, Note, MedicalMalpractice: A Lost Chance Is A CompensableInterest, 12
U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 471 (1992); Victoria E. MacIntosh, Note, Medical
Malpracticeand "Loss of Chance"Actions-What Standard Should FloridaAdopt?,
13 STETSON L. REv. 136 (1983); Warner Miller, Note, Herskovitsv. Group Health
Cooperative: Negligent Creation of a SubstantialRisk of Injury Is A Compensable
Harm, 9 U. PUGET SouND L. Rav. 251 (1985); Jack Rosati, Note, Causation in
MedicalMalpractice:A Modified ValuationApproach, 50 OIo ST. L.J. 469 (1989);
Donna H. Smith, Note, IncreasedRisk ofHarm: A New Standardfor Sufficiency of
Evidence of Causation in MedicalMalpractice Cases, 65 B.U. L. REV. 275 (1985);
Frances Thurman, Note, Loss of Chance in Medical Malpractice Cases: A Contra
View with an Examination of Tennessee's CurrentPosition, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV.
81 (1989); Kevin Joseph Willging, Case Note, Falcon v. Memorial Hospital: A
Rational Approach to Loss-of-Chance Tort Actions, 9 J. CONTEWMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 545 (1993).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/5
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framed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323(a), which views the
underlying injury as the ultimate injury sustained, usually death.3 Under the
second approach, courts treat the actual loss of a chance as a distinct,
compensable injury; thus, the loss of a chance is itself the underlying injury.
Dividing the many jurisdictions into various categories, however, is really an
exercise in broad generalization. Some courts develop standards that contain
elements of several approaches, while others develop standards that fail to fall
into any category. The legal standards for loss of a chance might more
accuratelybe described as a continuum that changes as the doctrine develops
and is tested over time.
Many courts cite Hamil v. Bashline,3 4 decided by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, as recognizing a cause of action for loss of a chance using the
relaxed causation theory under the Restatement, section 323(a). The section
reads:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services for
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's persons or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
35
harm ....
Under this standard, the plaintiff must show the defendant's acts or omissions
increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff. Thus, Hamil and other cases citing
section 323 characterize loss of chance as an "increased risk of harm."
In most negligence cases, the plaintiff alleges the defendant caused the
injury by setting in motion a force which resulted in harm.36 In medical
malpractice cases like Hamil, however, the plaintiff alleges the defendant
failed to protect from a preexisting disease, causing the injury by increasing
the risk of harm. 7
The Hamil court found that the effect of section 323 is to "relax the
degree of certitude" normally required of the plaintiff's evidence as to proof

33. Illustrative of the first "relaxed causation" approach are the decisions of the
Supreme Courts of Arizona in Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688
P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984); New Jersey in Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398 (N.J. 1990);
Oklahoma in McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987);
Pennsylvania in Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); Washington in
Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983); and
Wisconsin in Ehlinger by Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. 1990).
34. 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 323(a) (1965).
36. Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1286.
37. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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of causation in order to take the case to the jury." In cases where the
defendant allegedly increased the risk of harm, it may be difficult for the
plaintiff to prove the harm would not have resulted from the independent
source, even if the defendant had not been negligent. 9 "Such cases by their
very nature elude the degree of certainty one would prefer and upon which the
law normally insists before a person may be held liable."4 Accordingly,
"[s]ection 323(a) tacitly acknowledges this difficulty and permits the issue to
go to the jury upon a less than normal threshold of proof."'" Therefore, the
actor is not completely insulated from liability because of uncertainties
surrounding the consequences of the negligent conduct. If a plaintiff can
demonstrate the defendant's acts or omissions increased the risk of harm to
another,
such evidence furnishes a basis for the fact-finder to go further and find
that such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor in bringing about
the resultant harm; the necessary proximate cause will have been made out
if the jury sees fit to find cause in fact.42
The court emphasized that it did not intend to undermine the traditional
evidentiary burden, requiring a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as the
accepted norm for medical opinions regarding causation.43 However, in
increased risk of harm cases where section 323 applies a prima facie case of
liability is established if the plaintiff presents expert medical testimony, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the defendant's conduct increased
the risk of harm.44 Furthermore, the quantum of proof necessary to warrant
a jury verdict for the plaintiff would still be a preponderance of the

evidence.45
Most importantly, Hamil shifts evidentiary considerations to the factfinder when the plaintiff alleges an increased risk of harm. Thus, the
approach is labeled relaxed causation.
This relaxed causation approach was followed by the Supreme Court of
Washington in Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound.46

38. Id.
39. Id. at 1287.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1287-88.
42. Id. at 1288. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania framed increased risk of
harm as a proximate cause issue rather than a cause-in-fact (or but-for cause) issue.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1288 n.9.
46. 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (plurality opinion).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/5

8

1994]

Bruer: Bruer: Loss of a Chance As a Cause

LOSS OFA CHANCE

The court framed the issue as whether, under section 323, proof of increased
risk of death by decreased chance of survival was sufficient to present the
issue of proximate cause to the jury.47 Interpreting Hamil, the court stated
that "[i]t is not necessary for a plaintiff to introduce evidence to establish that
the negligence resulted in the injury or death, but simply that the negligence
increased the risk of injury or death. The step from the increased risk to
causation is one for the jury to make."4 The court held reduction of a

chance of survival from thirty-nine to twenty-five percent would be sufficient
evidence to allow the jury to consider the issue of proximate cause.
In Thompson v. Sun City Community HospitalInc.,49 the Supreme Court
of Arizona followed Hamil andHerskovits and employed the relaxed causation
approach. The court acknowledged the Restatement rule "permits the case to
go to the jury on the issue of causation with less definite evidence of
probability than the ordinary tort case."5 The jury is still instructed to find
for the defendant, however, "unless they find a probability that defendant's
negligence was a cause of plaintiff's injury."" Therefore, it appears the
traditional rules for proving causation remain intact, but the issue of causation
may go to the jury upon proof of increased risk of harm. 2 The jury will
decide the issue of probability.53
In McKellips v. Saint FrancisHospital, Inc.,54 the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma recognized a cause of action under a relaxed causation standard, but
emphasized the traditional rules for determining causation in ordinary
negligence cases would remain the same."
The lowered standard for
sufficiency of proof would allow the plaintiff to establish a jury question on
the issue of causation." "The jury would be required to determine whether
the increase in risk under the circumstances was more likely than not a
substantial factor in causing the harm."' 7 Establishing ajury question did not
require expert testimony expressing a precise percent loss of a chance.5"

47. Id. at 476. The court applied the relaxed causation standard to proximate
causation rather than but-for causation.
48. Id. at 478 (citing Hamil, 392 A.2d 1280).
49. 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984).
50. Id. at 615.
51. Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987).
55. Id. at 474-75.
56. Id. at 475.
57. Id.
58. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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Instead, testimony that the decedent's chances "would have significantly
improved" was sufficient.59
The Supreme Court of New Jersey adhered to its prior application of
section 323 in medical malpractice actions in Scafidi v. Seiler.6" "Evidence
demonstrating within a reasonable degree of medical probability that negligent
treatment increased the risk of harm posed by preexistent condition raises a
jury question whether the increased risk was a substantial factor in producing
the ultimate result."'" The court approved the use of a two-pronged jury
instruction. First, the jury must determine, as a matter of reasonable medical
probability, that the defendant's deviation from the standard of care increased
the risk of harm from the preexistent condition.62 Second, the jury must
determine whether the increase in risk was a substantial factor in producing
the ultimate result.63 "I]he substantial factor standard requires the jury to
determine whether the deviation [from the standard of care] was sufficiently
significant in relation to the eventual harm."'
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Ehlingerby Ehlingerv. Sipes" did
not apply section 323, but nevertheless viewed the underlying injury as death.
The court permitted the issue of causation to go to the jury on the basic

"substantial factor" theory. In reversing the court of appeals' interpretation of
section 323, the court noted "[s]ection 323(a) is generally viewed as relating
only to the duty element in a negligence action.... Section 323(a) does not,
as the court of appeals construed it to, lessen a plaintiff's burden of production
on the issue of causation."'66 Under Wisconsin law, section 323 was not
required to create a causation question for the jury. In short, "the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that the defendant's negligence was a substantial
factor in causing the plaintiff's harm."'6 The court defined substantial factor
as conduct that "has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead the trier
of fact, as a reasonable person, to regard it as a cause, using that word in the
popular sense."'68

59. Id.
60. 574 A.2d 398 (N.J. 1990). The Supreme Court of New Jersey also framed

its inquiry in terms of proximate cause. Id. at 401-02.
61. Id. at 405-06.
62. Id. at 406.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court did not elaborate further or attempt to quantify substantial or
sufficiently significant.
65. 454 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. 1990).
66. Id. at 758 (citations omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/5

10

Bruer: Bruer: Loss of a Chance As a Cause

1994]

LOSS OFA CHANCE

The court refined this standard into a three-pronged test necessary to
satisfy the burden of production on the issue of causation. In order to satisfy
the test, the plaintiff must show that "the omitted treatment was intended to
prevent the very type of harm which resulted, that the plaintiff would have
submitted to the treatment, and that it is more probable than not the treatment
'
could have lessened or avoided the plaintiff's injury had it been rendered."69
If this burden is met, the trier of fact should determine whether the
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm.7'
The court emphasized that the plaintiff need not show proper treatment would
have been successful in lessening or avoiding the harm; only that it could have
lessened or avoided it. 1 Finally, the court pointed out that the jury, in
considering whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in
causing harm, may conclude that the conduct was not a substantial factor
"because the injuries would have occurred irrespective of the negligence."72
Several other jurisdictions have used section 323 when the plaintiff
alleges the defendant increased the risk of harm, but fail to expressly indicate
whether the "relaxed causation" or the traditional evidentiary standard of proof
would apply.73
Some courts, frustrated with the confusion of the various standards of
proof, burdens of production, and ambiguous language involved with the
section 323 relaxed causation approach, have developed a "pure chance"
standard. This standard is almost universally recognized as deriving from an
article by Yale Law School Professor Joseph H. King, Jr.:
To illustrate, consider the case in which a doctor negligently fails to
diagnose a patient's cancerous condition until it has become inoperable.
Assume further that even with a timely diagnosis the patient would have
had only a 30% chance of recovering from the disease and surviving over

69. Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 763.

72. Id.
73. See Thornton, 305 S.E.2d at 324-25 ("where a plaintiff in a malpractice case
has demonstrated that a defendant's acts or omissions have increased the risk of harm

...and ... such increased risk of harm was a substantial factor in bringing about the
ultimate injury to the plaintiff, then the defendant is liable for such ultimate injury.");
Aasheim, 695 P.2d at 828 ("[t]he trier of fact should determine whether defendant's
negligence was a substantial factor in reducing plaintiffs chances of obtaining a better

result.") This court phrased the issue as whether the conduct reducedthe plaintiff's
chances, but held that the jury instruction should reflect the substantive law of § 323.

See also Roberson, 686 P.2d at 160 ("[w]hether the negligence of defendant was a
substantial factor in death is a matter for determination by a jury upon due

consideration of all related factors.").
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the long term. There are two ways of handling such a case. Under the
traditional approach, this loss of a not-better-than-even chance of recovering
from the cancer would not be compensable because it did not appear more
likely than not that the patient would have survived with proper care.
Recoverable damages, if any, would depend on the extent to which it
appeared that cancer killed the patient sooner than it would have with
timely diagnosis and treatment, and on the extent to which the delay in
diagnosis
aggravated the patient's condition, such as by causing additional
74
pain.

Describing his pure chance theory, King stated:
A more rational approach, however, would allow recovery for the loss of
the chance of cure even though the chance was not better than even. The
probability of long-term survival would be reflected in the amount of
damages awarded for the loss of the chance. While the plaintiff here could
not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was denied a cure by
the defendant's negligence, he could show
by a preponderance that he was
5
deprived of a 30% chance of a cure.
Under the pure chance standard, the underlying injury is viewed as the lost
chance rather than the ultimate injury sustained."6
In Deburkarte v.
Louvar," the Supreme Court of Iowa declined to employ the relaxed
causation theory under section 323(a). Instead, the court found that section
323 indicates the injury may also be viewed as the lost chance to survive.7"
Although the court affirmed jury instructions virtually identical to section
323(a), it added that the failure to exercise reasonable care must not only
increase risk, but also be a proximate cause of increasing the risk. According
to the court, a failure to exercise reasonable care is a proximate cause "when
the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the condition or
injury sustained and when it appears that if it had not been for such act or
omission the condition would not have been brought about or the injury

74. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in PersonalInjury
Torts InvolvingPreexistingConditionsand FutureConsequences,90 YALE L.J. 1353,
1363-64 (1981).

75. Id.
76. Illustrative of the pure chance approach are the decisions of the Supreme
Courts of Iowa in Deburkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa, 1986); Michigan in
Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990); Nevada in Perez v. Las
Vegas Medical Cnr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991); and the Indiana Court of Appeals in
Mayhue v. Sparkman, 627 N.E.2d 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
77. 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986).
78. Id. at 135.
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sustained."79 The court defined substantial as conduct that "has such an
effect in80 producing the harm as to lead a reasonable person to regard it as a
cause.II

1 moved further away from section 323
Falcon v. Memorial Hospital"
toward the pure chance theory. The Supreme Court of Michigan viewed the
underlying injury as the "loss of opportunity of avoiding physical harm."'
The traditional standard for the burden of production, more probable than not,
would remain the same; but the fact to be proven changed from cause of death
to the loss of opportunity. The plaintiff must show, more probably than not,
that "had there been a correct diagnosis, the patient would have had a
substantial opportunity of avoiding the course of the disease and treatment that
occurred."' The court held that the thirty-seven and one-half percent chance
of living in the case before it was a loss of a substantial opportunity of
avoiding harm. 4 The court expressly declined to decide, however, what
lesser percentage would still constitute a substantial loss of opportunity.'
The Supreme Court of Nevada in Perez v. Las MedicalCenter 6 adopted
the loss of a chance doctrine. The court stated that under this doctrine, the
injury to be redressed is not the death itself, but the decreased chance of
survivalY Like Falcon, the court noted that defining the injury as the loss
of chance of survival avoids the burden of production distinction involved in

the relaxed causation cases; the traditional rule of preponderance will continue
to apply.'

Specifically,

the plaintiff must present evidence tending to show, to a reasonable medical
probability, that some negligent act or omission by health care providers
reduced a substantial chance of survival given appropriate medical care. In
accord with other courts adopting this view, we need not now state exactly
how high the chances of survival must be in order to be "substantial."8 9

79. Id. at 138.
80. Id. This follows the Restatement. This definition seems particularly circular
as the court had been previously attempting to define cause. See supra note 24.
81. 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich 1990).
82. Id. at 52.
83. Id. at 57 n.43.
84. Id. at 56.
85. Id. at 56-57.
86. 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991).
87. Id. at 592.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court noted this issue would be addressed on a case by case basis,
but doubted the dissent's example of a ten percent chance of survival would be
actionable. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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By viewing the underlying injury as the loss of a chance, the courts
employing the pure chance approach maintain traditional rules for proving
causation; the only change is recognizing the loss of a chance as a
compensable injury. As Perez demonstrates, the plaintiff must still prove the
defendant's act or failure to act more probably than not caused the loss of a
chance and the evidence must still demonstrate within reasonable medical
certainty that the act or failure to act caused the loss of a chance.9"
The Indiana Court of Appeals adopted the pure loss of a chance doctrine
in Mayhue v. Sparkman.9 1 The court rejected the section 323 approach
because it "addresses the issue of duty, not causation."' Furthermore, under
section 323, "the compensable injury is generally viewed as the death and
recovery for the death is allowed in the absence of a causal relationship
between the negligence and the death."' The court found the underlying
injury to be the loss of chance rather than the death.94 Under this approach,
the traditional reasonable probability test is still applied.95 The plaintiff must
show, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the defendant
decreased the plaintiff's chance of survival or successful treatment.96 The
court later qualified this standard by requiring that the defendant deprive the
The court did not define
plaintiff of a substantial chance of survival."
determined
on a case by case
substantial, but instead left the issue to be
98
basis.
2. Damage Valuation
The damage valuation method used by a court will often depend upon the
legal standard applicable to loss of a chance. Like the legal standards, the

damage valuation methods are not easily categorized.99

90. Id.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

627 N.E.2d 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 1359.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1360.
Id.

97. Id.

98. Id. The court, in conclusion, noted that in order for the husband to prevail
on his loss of consortium claim (an entirely different cause of action from loss of a
chance), he would still need to prove all the elements of a negligence claim, including
causation as it is traditionally defined. Id. at 1361.
99. For a thorough discussion of damages under loss of a chance, see McMahon,
supranote 32.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/5
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The Herskovits court, using the relaxed causation standard, held that
causing the loss of a chance does not necessitate a total recovery for all
damages caused by the injury. "Damages should be awarded to the injured
party or his family based only on damages caused directly by premature death,
such as lost earnings and additional medical expenses, etc."'0 0
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in McKellips also used the relaxed
causation approach. It noted that Herskovits did not offer a clear method to
adjust the damage award. Rather than relying upon the jury's common sense
to discount the damages, "[t]he amount of damages recoverable is equal to the
percent of chance lost multiplied by the total amount of damages which are
ordinarily allowed in a wrongful death action."'' 1 This method of measuring
damage recovery was taken from Professor King's article:" °
To illustrate, consider a patient who suffers a heart attack and dies as a
result. Assume that the defendant-physician negligently misdiagnosed the
patient's condition, but that the patient would have had only a 40% chance
of survival even with a timely diagnosis and proper care. Regardless of
whether it could be said that the defendant caused the decedent's death, he
caused the loss of chance and that chance-interest should be completely
redressed in its own right. Under the proposed rule, the plaintiff's
compensation for the loss of the victim's chance of surviving the heart
attack would be 40% of the compensable value of the victim's life had he
survived (including what his earning capacity would otherwise have been
in the years following death). The value placed on the patient's life would
reflect such factors as his age, health, and earning potential, including the

fact that he had suffered the heart attack and the assumption that he had
survived10 3it. The 40% computation would be applied to that based [sic]
figUre."

The Supreme Court of New Jersey also cited this illustration as the
appropriate standard for determining damages.'0 4 In the court's view, "a
rule that limits a plaintiff's damages. . to the value of the lost chance of
recovery is an essential complement to... modification of the proof required
to establish proximate causation."'1 5 The damages aspect of the cases using
the relaxed causation standard makes them especially confusing. Courts view
the underlying injury as death and relax the plaintiff s burden to prove

100.
101.
102.
103.

Herskovits,664 P.2d at 479.
McKellipps, 741 P.2d at 476-77.
See supra note 74.
Supra note 74, at 1382. King calculates damages based on the value of the

decedent's life to the decedent.

104. Scafidi, 574 A.2d at 407.
105. Id. at 408.
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causation. The courts compensate, however, not for the ultimate injury but
for the loss of a chance.
In Falcon, the Supreme Court of Michigan used the pure chance
approach and employed a damage valuation method similar to that proposed
by Professor King and used by the court in McKellips. The percentage of
for wrongful death would be an
chance lost "times the damages recoverable
10 6
appropriate measure of damages.1
In Deburkarte, the Supreme Court of Iowa also compensated for the
value of the lost chance."° "The jury's task was to value that reduction [in
the decedent's chance of survival]. It was limited under the instructions to
award damages for past unreimbursed medical expenses, and past and future
pain and suffering for the reduction." 8
Finally, the Supreme Court of Nevada adopted the pure loss of chance
doctrine and, citing McKellips, held that the amount of damages recoverable
would be the percent of lost chance of survival multiplied by the total amount
of damages allowable in a wrongful death action." 9 The court added an
important qualifier, however, to damage awards: "the plaintiff or injured
person cannot recover merely on the basis of a decreased chance of survival
or of avoiding a debilitating illness or injury; the plaintiff must in fact suffer
10°
death or debilitating injury before there can be an award of damages."
3. Policy Considerations
Courts cite a number of different policy considerations for rejecting the
traditional standard of more likely than not causation. The standard "declares

open season on critically ill or injured persons as care providers would be free
of liability for even the grossest malpractice if the patient had only a fifty-fifty
chance of surviving the disease or injury even with proper treatment.""'
The traditional standard "puts a premium on each party's search for the
willing witness... . [Efor every expert witness who evaluates the lost chance
at 49% there is another who estimates it at closer to 51%. "'l' The standard

106. Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 57.
107. DeBurkarte,393 N.W.2d at 139.
108. Id.
109. Perez, 805 P.2d at 592.
110. Id. See also Mayhue, 627 N.E.2d at 1360 ("[R]ecovery for the loss of
chance of survival can only occur where the patient dies because a patient who is still
living has not lost the chance of survival.").
111. Roberson, 686 P.2d at 160.
112. Thompson, 688 P.2d at 615. See also McKellips, 741 P.2d at 474 ("Under
the present standard of probability applied in all negligence cases.., an expert must
speak the 'magic words,' i.e., that the defendant's conduct more probably than not
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defeats a primary function of the tort system--deterrence-because it
"prevents any individual in a group from recovering, even though it may be
statistically irrefutable that some have been injured.""1 3
Another underlying reason for adopting loss of a chance is to prohibit the
wrongdoer, who puts the possibility of recovery beyond realization, from
saying afterward that "the result was inevitable. .

.

. To decide otherwise

would be a blanket release from liability for doctors and hospitals any time
there was a less than a 50 percent chance of survival, regardless of how
flagrant the conduct."'1
In this limited class of cases, the defendant's
actions force the court to look at the proverbial crystal ball to decide what
might have been." 5 Thus, the courts will refuse to place upon an injured
person "the burden of proving what more probably than not would have
happened had the defendant not been negligent.""' 6
Adopting loss of a chance recognizes the realities inherent in medical
malpractice litigation: "[p]eople who seek medical treatment are diseased or
injured. Failure
to diagnose or properly treat denies the opportunity to
117
recover."

Finally, loss of a chance serves important societal interests. "A rule of
law that more precisely confines physicians' liability for negligence to the
value of the interest damaged18should have a salutary effect on the cost and
availability of medical care.'1

caused the injury, to ensure that a verdict will not be directed for the defendant.");
Ehlinger, 454 N.W.2d at 761 ("[T]o require a plaintiff ... to prove what more
probably than not would have happened had the defendant not been negligent would

require just that, expert testimony by a physician speculating as to the success of a
particular treatment, a fact which inherently is incapable of proof to a reasonable
certainty.").
113. Thompson, 688 P.2d at 607. See also McKellips, 741 P.2d at 474 ("[T]his
view tends to subvert the deterrence function of tort law.").
114. Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 476-77. See also Perez, 805 P.2d at 591 (The
traditional rule "would bar any recovery in tort on behalf of the survivors of many
potentially terminal patients, no matter how blatant the health care provider's
negligence." The physician could reduce a patient's chances of survival from fifty to
ten percent "and yet remain unanswerable in the law of tort. This position is simply
untenable.").
115. Thompson, 688 P.2d at 616.
116. Ehlinger,454 N.W.2d at 761.
117. Aasheim, 695 P.2d at 828.
118. Scafidi, 574 A.2d at 408.
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B. JurisdictionsDenying Recovery For Loss of a Chance
A number of jurisdictions deny recovery for loss of a chance." 9 These
courts adhere to the traditional standard for proving causation by requiring the
plaintiff to show the defendant's conduct more probably than not caused the
ultimate injury. 2 ' As long as the plaintiff can show the defendant caused
the injury, the plaintiff can recover all damages resulting from the injury. If
the plaintiff cannot show the defendant caused the injury, the plaintiff recovers
no damages. This is sometimes referred to as the "all-or-nothing" approach.
Courts rejecting loss of a chance cite a number of policy reasons counseling
against recognition of the cause of action.
Many courts follow the reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cooper

v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati:'
Lesser standards of proof are understandably attractive in malpractice
cases where physicalwell being, and life itself, are the subject of litigation.
The strong intuitive sense of humanity tends to emotionally direct us toward
a conclusion that in an action for wrongful death an injured person should
be compensated for the loss of any chance for survival, regardless of its
remoteness. However, we would have trepidations that such a rule would
be so loose that it would produce more injustice than justice.'22
Florida also rejected the loss of a chance theory in Gooding v. University
HospitalBuilding, Inc."z The court pointed out that the theory could create
an injustice because health care providers would be forced to defend cases
where either a patient fails to improve or where serious disease processes are
not eliminated by a course of action that could somehow produce a better
result."2 "[N]o other professional malpractice defendant carries this burden

119. In the following jurisdictions, the courts deny loss of a chance as a theory
of recovery in medicalmalpractice cases: Levesque v. Regional Medical Cir. Bd., 612
So. 2d 445, 448 (Ala. 1993); Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015,
1020 (Fla. 1984); Manningv. Twin Falls Clinic and Hosp., Inc., 830 P.2d 1185, 1190

(Idaho 1991); Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 215 (Ivd. Ct.
Spec. App. 1990); Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1993); PillsburyFlood v. Portsmouth Hosp., 512 A.2d 1126, 1130 (N.H. 1986); Cooper v. Sisters of
Charity, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ohio 1971); Sherer v. James, 351 S.E.2d 148,
150-51 (S.C. 1986); Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594,596 (Tenn. 1993); Kramer
v. Lewisville Memorial Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 398 (rex. 1993).
120. See, e.g., Cooper,272 N.E.2d at 103.
121. 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971).
122. Id. at 103.
123. 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).
124. Id. at 1019-20.
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of liability without the requirement that plaintiffs prove the alleged negligence
probably rather than possibly caused the injury.1"
In addition, Pillsbury-Floodv. Portsmouth Hospital"6 rejected loss of
a chance. According to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, "[c]ausation
is a matter of probability, not possibility.""2 7 Adopting loss of a chance
would be contrary to "a fundamental tenet of tort law that the plaintiff retains
the ultimate burden of persuasion in negligence actions."' 28 Upholding the
traditional rule ensures that defendants will not be required to disprove
causation.'29
The reasoning of Hamil and its progeny, using section 323 to relax the
burden of proof as to causation, was also criticized in Sherer v. James.3 '
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that even if section 323(a) applies
to a medical malpractice case, "it applies only to duty and not proximate
cause."'' Furthermore, even if section 323 could be construed to relate to
proximate cause, the court was unwilling to relax the traditional standard.
Through the use of a hypothetical situation, the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Fennell v. Southern MarylandHospital Center, Inc.'32 examined
the statistical problems associated with adopting loss of a chance:
To compare the two rules, assume a hypothetical group of 99 cancer
patients, each of whom would have had a 33 1/3% chance of survival.
Each received negligent medical care, and all 99 died. Traditional tort law
would deny recovery in all 99 cases because each patient had less than a
50% chance of recovery and the probable cause of death was the preexisting cancer not the negligence. Statistically, had all 99 received proper
treatment, 33 would have lived and 66 would have died; so the traditional

rule would have statistically produced 33 errors by denying recovery to all
99.
The loss of chance rule would allow all 99 patients recover, but each
would recover 33 1/3% of the normal value of the case. Again, withproper

care 33 patients would have survived.

Thus, the 33 patients who

statisticallywould have survived with proper care would receive only onethird of the appropriate recovery, while the 66 patients who died as a result

ofthe pre-existing condition, not the negligence, would be overcompensated

Id. at 1020.
512 A.2d 1126 (N.H. 1986).
Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1130.
351 S.E.2d 148 (S.C. 1986).
Id. at 150.
132. 580 A.2d 206 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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by one-third.
Thb loss of chance rule would have produced errors in all 99
33
cases.1

3 4 reviewed the
Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic and Hospital, Inc."
standards of relaxed causation and lost chance and rejected both. The court
affirmed the decision of the trial court to instruct the jury based on substantial
factor language for proximate cause. Proximate cause should be defined as
"a cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the complained
injury, loss or damage. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is
a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage." ' This
standard, according to the court, strikes a fair balance between the claimant
and defense.136 While the court expressly rejected loss of a chance, the
substantial factor instruction nevertheless resembles instructions in other
jurisdictions that purport to adopt loss of a chance.
Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital'37 points out a flaw in the
reasoning of pure loss of a chance cases, where the underlying injury is
deemed to be the loss of chance rather than the ultimate physical harm.
"Unless courts are going to compensate patients who 'beat the odds' and make
full recovery, the lost chance cannot be proven unless and until the ultimate
harm occurs." 3 ' Furthermore, a court cannot in any principled way apply
loss of a chance to other professionals, such as lawyers who negligently
handle cases and reduce their client's chances of winning.'39

C. Missouri Law
In Missouri, prior to the Wollen decision, in order to show a causal
connection between the defendant's actions and the injury, the plaintiff was
required to show "the injury would not have been sustained but for the

133. Id. at 213-14. See also Mayhue v. Sparkman, 627 N.E.2d 1354, 1361
(Staton, J., dissenting); Lisa Perrochet et al., supra note 32.
134. 830 P.2d 1185 (Idaho 1991).
135. Id. at 1189.
136. Id. at 1190.
137. 858 S.W.2d 397, 405 (Tex. 1994). In rejecting loss of a chance, the Texas
Supreme Court employed language resembling Fourteenth Amendment incorporation

theory: "The more likely than not standard is thus not some arbitrary, irrational
benchmark for cutting offmalpractice recoveries, but rather a fundamental prerequisite
of an ordered system of justice." Id.
138. Id.

139. Id. at 406. The court also noted that RESTATEMEm (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 323 (1964) "does not determine or suggest the appropriate standard of causation."
Kramer, 858 S.W.2d at 405.
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negligence." ' To establish a jury question on causation, the plaintiff was
required to prove that it was more probable than not the injury was caused by
the defendant's negligence.' 4' In introducing evidence of causation, the
plaintiff must be able to demonstrate with reasonable medical or scientific
certainty that the defendant's negligence caused the harm.'42 Against the
background of these legal principles, the Supreme Court of Missouri
considered Ms. Wollen's complaint.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
Judge Benton, writing for a unanimous court in Wollen, framed the issue
in the case as "whether the ultimate legal fact of causation can be inferred
from [the] facts."' 43 If the plaintiff can plead there is "reasonable medical
or scientific certainty" that the defendant's negligence caused the harm,
causation can be inferred from the facts.'
A case involves reasonable
medical certainty when there is a cure that works "in the overwhelming
'
majority of cases."145
The court noted that in failure to diagnose cases,
a statistic is often used to show causation. 4 The statistic, however, cannot
demonstrate causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty because
"there is a real chance that the patient will survive and a real chance that the

patient will die."' 47

Therefore, under the traditional rules, the pleading

would not survive a motion to dismiss. The court then addressed alternative
theories of recovery.
The court first disposed of Ms. Wollen's argument that the defendants'
actions were a substantial factor contributing to her husband's death. To be
a substantial factor in causing injury, a plaintiff must show it is more likely
than not that but for the actions of the tortfeasors, the injury would not have
occurred.'
Because Ms. Wollen could only allege that the defendants'
actions might have contributed to her husband's death, Ms. Wollen could not

140. Delisiv. St. Luke's Episcopal-Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 701 S.W.2d 170, 175
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Robbinsv. JewishHosp., 663 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983)).
141. Motley v. Colley, 769 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Fujita
v. Jeffries, 714 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
142. Schiles v. Shaefer, 710 S.W.2d 254, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
143. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 682.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 683.

148. Id.
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defendants' actions were a substantial factor in causing his
show 1the
49
death.
The court next considered whether Missouri should recognize a theory
based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 323(a). 50 The court
found that although section 323 creates a duty of care, it does not alter the
Because the court had just rejected Ms. Wollen's
rules of causation.'
argument that the defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in causing Mr.
Wollen's death, section 323 did not enable Ms. Wollen to recover.'
Finally, the court considered whether Ms. Wollen was entitled to relief
under the lost chance of recovery theory. The court found that a medical
patient suffers a harm when a physician fails to diagnose or treat a disease; but
the harm suffered is the loss of a chance of recovery rather than the loss of
life or limb." Damages are measured by multiplying the value of a lost
In a case involving
life or limb by the chance of recovery lost.'
comparative fault, the damage award would be reduced by any percentage of
fault attributed to the plaintiff.'55 The cause of action for lost chance of
recovery would be limited to cases inwhich the chance of recovery was
"sizeable enough to be material." 6
In concluding, the court noted the proper statute by which loss of a
chance of recovery actions must be brought. Ms. Wollen brought her case
under Missouri's wrongful death statute, which requires that the death of a
The wrongful
person must result from the negligence of the tortfeasors.'
death statute applies, therefore, when the injury causes death. 8 Because
there is a significant chance of either survival or death in loss of a chance
cases, it is impossible to prove that a persons's death resulted from the failure
to properly diagnose or treat.'59 Thus, loss of a chance of recovery actions

149. Id.
150. Id. at 686. It is noteworthy that this theory was not discussed in the
plaintiff's brief; it appeared for the first time in oral argument before the Supreme
Court. Id.
151. Id. at 683.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 684.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 684 n.2.
156. Id. at 685 n.3. The question of materiality will be left to the jury to
determine. The lost chance must be "statistically significant within applicable
statistical standards." Id.
157. Id. at 685. See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080 (1986) (Missouri'swrongful
death statute), supra note 3.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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cannot be brought under Missouri's wrongful death statute.16 Instead, a
plaintiff must bring suit under Missouri's survivorship statute, which applies
when the alleged injury did not cause death."' Based on this analysis, the
court allowed Ms. Wollen to amend her petition and bring the suit under
Missouri's survivorship statute.162
V. COMMENT
As with the recognition of any new cause of action, Wollen raises
important issues of both policy and practicality.
A. Policy Issues
Loss of a chance is a compelling subject not only in the realm of tort
liability but also in medicine. Recognizing loss of a chance may or may not
affect the costs of medical care. While impressive statistics can be marshalled
by both supporters and opponents of the rule, it seems impossible to
conclusively determine the impact of loss of a chance upon medical care costs.
Judge Chasanow, writing for the majority in Fennell,posed a hypothetical
to analyze loss of a chance and concluded that it should be rejected as a cause
of action.'
Further examination of the statistical analysis posed by the
court in Fennell leads this author to believe no additional money would
change hands between plaintiffs and defendants under loss of chance, as
compared to the traditional standards, provided there are equal numbers of
people on either side of the traditional fifty percent standard.

Suppose in the Fennell hypothetical that each plaintiff sustained one
dollar in damages. Under the traditional system, since injured plaintiffs could
not recover any amount of money, the medical defendants would pay nothing.
Under the loss of chance rule, the thirty-three undercompensated plaintiffs
would recover one-third of their damages, or eleven dollars. The sixty-six
overcompensated plaintiffs would also recover one-third of their damages, or
twenty-two dollars. Thus, the medical defendants would pay a total of thirtythree dollars. The difference between the traditional system (no recovery) and
the loss of chance rule (thirty-three dollars total) yields a thirty-three dollar
detriment for the medical defendants.
However, consider a group of ninety-nine people on the other side of the
coin, each with a sixty-six and two-thirds chance of survival. Again, suppose

160. Id.
161. Id. at 685. See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.020 (1986) (Missouri's
survivorship statute), supranote 16.
162. Id.
163. See supra text accompanying note 133.
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each injured plaintiff sustained one dollar in damages. Under the traditional
system, because the chance of survival is greater than fifty percent, the
medical defendants would pay all damages to all plaintiffs, for a total of
ninety-nine dollars.
Under the loss of chance rule, the sixty-six
undercompensated plaintiffs would recover two-thirds of their damages, or
forty-four dollars. The thirty-three overcompensated plaintiffs would also
recover two-thirds of their damages, or twenty-two dollars. Thus the medical
defendants would pay a total of sixty-six dollars. The difference between the
traditional system (ninety-nine dollars total) and the loss of chance rule (sixtysix dollars total) yields a thirty-three dollar benefitto the medical defendants.
This hypothetical demonstrates that the medical defendants will pay out
more money under the loss of chance rule than under the traditional system
when the chance of survival is less than fifty percent, but less money when the
chance is greater than fifty percent. If statistically there are just as many
people with a less than fifty percent chance to survive before the failure to
diagnose and treat as there are with a greater than fifty percent chance to
survive, the money changing hands between plaintiffs and defendants will still
be the same.
The value of Fennell's hypothetical is that it precisely embodies a major
rationale behind American tort law: loss spreading. Additional errors
resulting from applying the loss of chance rule is simply another way of
saying more people are compensated than would statistically deserve
compensation. Because more people are compensated but the same amount
of money changes hands under the loss of chance rule, it seems the general
class of plaintiffs, rather than the individual plaintiffs, bears the loss of
potential undercompensation.
One drawback of the loss of chance rule is increased transaction costs,
i.e., litigation costs. The loss of a chance rule allows more suits to be
brought. Thus, medical defendants will actually be paying more to lawyers,
experts, and courts. At least one court has suggested a counter argument: "in
cases where the chances of survival were modest, plaintiffs will have little
monetary incentive to bring a case to trial because damages would be
drastically reduced to account for the preexisting condition."'"
It is likely that loss of a chance arguments will be made to expand
liabilities in areas beside medical malpractice, despite the courts' admonitions
that the doctrine is limited to those types of cases. Several courts have
already confronted this argument in legal malpractice cases.'65 While the
policy reasons set forth for adopting loss of a chance seem equally applicable

164. Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991).
165. See Polly A. Lord, Comment, Loss of a Chance in Legal Malpractice,61
WASH. L. REV. 1479 (1986).
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to other areas of negligence, distinguishing when loss of a chance is
appropriate will be a difficult challenge.

B. PracticalIssues
Aside from the general policy questions surrounding the adoption of loss
of a chance, Wollen leaves a few practical issues unresolved.
Missouri Approved Instructions ("MAI") 21.09 sets out jury instructions
for damages under lost chance of survival. The jury must determine the total
amount of damages sustained by the decedent before death as a direct result
of the absence of recovery and any damages sustained by the decedent's
survivors after death as a direct result of the decedent's death.'6 6 The Notes
on Use following the section state:
While a case in which the "lost chance of recovery" resulting in death
is brought in the name of the personal representative of the decedent,

damages are to be determined in accordance with elements of damages in
a wrongful death case and set forth in § 537.090, RSMo. Likewise, the
"survivors" of decedent referred to in this instruction, and from whose
perspective damages due to the death are to be determined, are those
persons allowed to recover in a wrongful death case as set forth in
§ 537.080, RSMo.' 67
These instructions seem to be inconsistent with the Wollen opinion. The

court stated that the instructions for loss of a chance would require the jury
to find the value of the lost life or limb."' Furthermore, the court expressly
prohibited loss of a chance cases from being brought under Missouri's
wrongful death statute. However, the MAI instructions state that the
decedent's survivors may recover damages allowable under the wrongful death
statute.
One of the most important issues Wollen raises is exactly when loss of
a chance applies. Will the wrongful death statute apply when the defendant
fails to diagnose and treat a preexisting condition? A lawyer confronted with
a potential wrongfil death or loss of a chance case should evaluate the
evidence to determine how the case might be characterized. As Judge Benton
points out in Wollen, there are three initial possibilities: first, a circumstance
where a cure works in the overwhelming majority of cases; second, a
circumstance where a cure fails in the overwhelming majority of cases; and

166. See also 49 J. Mo. B. 232 (1993).
167. Id. at 233.

168. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 684 n.2.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 5

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

third, a circumstance where treatment works in a large number of cases and
fails in a large number of cases. 6 9
If the evidence falls into the first possibility, one in which a cure works
in the overwhelming majority of cases, the plaintiff will be able to plead with
reasonable medical certainty that the defendant's act or failure to act caused
the harm.'1" Thus, recovery may be allowed under the wrongful death
statute.
On the other extreme, if the evidence demonstrates that there is no known
cure for the disease and medical science could have at best only extended the
decedent's life a short time, the evidence falls into the second possibility."'
The defendant can establish with reasonable medical certainty that the act or
failure to act did not cause the harm. Recovery should be denied under both
the wrongful death and the survivorship statute.
In the third possibility suggested by Judge Benton, the evidence falls
between the first and second possibilities. There is a real chance that the
decedent would have lived and a real chance that the decedent would have
died even if properly diagnosed." 2 Because the evidence in this third
possibility does not normally involve reasonable medical certainty, it is
impossible for an expert to show the effect of the defendant's act or failure to
act. 73 Thus, recovery might be allowed but reduced under the survivorship
statute.
Accordingly, for either the plaintiff or defendant, the magic words appear
to be "overwhelming majority of cases." Both sides will optimally want the
facts to be cast in these terms. Use of these somewhat artificial verbal
distinctions, however, may present practical problems for a court. First, what
exactly does "overwhelming" mean? Can a statistic alone be translated to
mean overwhelming, and if so, at what point does a statistic become
overwhelming? Second, is the definition of overwhelming a question of law,
fact, or both? In other words, who decides what overwhelming means?
Should the trial judge alone make a legal determination of whether the facts
demonstrate an overwhelming cure, should the judge make an initial
determination and allow the jury to ultimately decide whether the facts
demonstrate an overwhelming cure, or should the jury alone determine
whether the cure is indeed overwhelming? Finally, what degree of discretion
should be left to the body that defines overwhelming if the case is appealed?
If the evidence does not fall in the first or second possibilities, both sides
could further evaluate the evidence in the third possibility to argue that

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 682.
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Id.
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recovery, though possibly allowed but reduced under the survivorship statute,
should instead be either allowed in full under the wrongful death statute or
denied under both the wrongful death and the survivorship statute.
The evidence could be evaluated in two different areas: the statistical
percent chance of survival and the amount of evidence, if any, establishing the
decedent's particular chance. At least four different possibilities can be

envisioned.
Two possibilities involve the use of statistical evidence only: first, a
situation where the statistical chance of survival is less than fifty percent; and
second, a situation where the statistical chance of survival is greater than fifty
percent. In both possibilities, the statistical inference between the act or
failure to act and death involves a "speculative leap of faith."174
Judge Benton presented these first two possibilities in Wollen and found
that neither would be allowed under the wrongful death statute. Regardless
of whether the loss chance of survival is less than or greater than fifty percent,
"statistical evidence-without more-does not give a jury a basis to believe
that the decedent belongs to either the group that lives, or the group that
As long as the plaintiff can present a statistic in which the lost
dies." '
chance of survival is sizeable enough to be material, however, these actions
will survive a motion to dismiss if filed under the survivorship statute. 1 6
The remaining two possibilities involve more than statistical evidence,
regardless of the statistical chance of survival. The evidence in these
possibilities establishes with reasonable medical certainty that the decedent
would have been in either the group that lives or the group that dies. In the
first possibility, the plaintiff might argue that recovery should be allowed in
full under the wrongful death statute. In the second possibility, the defendant
might argue that recovery should be denied under both the wrongful death and
the survivorship statute. Either side must present an additional quantum of
evidence, beyond a mere statistic, that demonstrates a logical rather than
speculative inference between the act or failure to act and death.
The difficulty in these remaining two possibilities will be producing
evidence establishing with reasonable medical certainty that the decedent
would have been in the group that lives or dies. A lawyer may want to gather
additional evidence that the decedent shared distinguishing characteristics with
a particular group, thus making the decedent more likely to live or die. As
with the overwhelming majority of cases standard, production of this
additional evidence could present problems for the court. When will the

evidence establish with reasonable medical certainty that the decedent would
have been in a particular group, and who will decide this question? What if

174. Id. at 685.
175. Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
176. Id.
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both sides produce equally convincing statistical evidence? One can imagine
a statistical battle leaving the fact-finder in complete confusion. Nevertheless,
allowing the use of statistics in these medical malpractice cases seems to more
closely
match what Judge Benton described as the "maybe" aspect of everyday
177
life.
VI. CONCLUSION
Examination of the loss of a chance doctrine reveals much disagreement

among the courts. Both proponents and opponents of loss of a chance seem
to point out equally plausible reasons why the doctrine should or should not
be adopted. Finding the "right' method to argue and decide these cases is
extremely difficult.
Judge Levin of the Supreme Court of Michigan writes in Falcon v.
MemorialHospitalthat the standards of causation are "analytic devices-tools
to be used in making causation judgments. They do not and cannot yield
ultimate truth. Absolute certainty in matters of causation is a rarity."'78
After noting the welter of confusion regarding causation, Prosser and Keeton
point out the concept of cause "is associated with policy--with our more or
less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands."' 79 The wisdom
of these jurists should not be forgotten when examining the doctrine of loss
of a chance.
ROBERT S. BRUER
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